On March 2, the Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Reform provided an update on the progress of its Congressionally mandated reform efforts. The Commission, focused on improving the PPBE process, has spent months collecting insight from industry experts, think tanks, FFRDCs, universities, and practitioners from Congress and the Department of Defense (DoD).
The Commission’s research and outreach is extensive in its scope and diversity of sources. The Commission conducted 27 meetings, including interviews with various stakeholders and participants in the PPBE process. They also engaged with congressional committees and organizations such as the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and the Government Accountability Office. In addition to expert interviews, they hosted "Open Mic" sessions with Program Managers, PEOs, and Financial Managers. The Commission also prioritized gathering feedback from private industry and FFRDCs, while deploying its own research team to analyze individual case studies.
Due to the wide variety of interviewees, it may not be surprising that the commission received contradicting feedback. Here are some examples:
Contradiction 1 – On Large Scale Systems
- The PPBE process works better for acquiring and funding large-scale systems.
- The PPBE process is inadequate for both large-scale systems and new technologies such as software and AI.
Contradiction 2 – On Long Range Planning
- The PPBE process allows for coordinated delivery of resources.
- PPBE may impede long range planning innovation and adaptive response to emerging needs.
Contradiction 3 – On Continuing Resolutions’ (CRs) effects on PPBE
- CRs and delayed appropriations increase inefficiency and costs while harming present and future readiness.
- The DoD adapted to CRs, so trying to alleviate their effects may hinder future budget implementation.
Contradiction 4 – On Metrics & Measuring
- PPBE process lacks metrics and mechanisms for measuring capabilities and delivery to the warfighter.
- PPBE includes the mechanisms which intersect with the process to measure the effectiveness of the DoD’s warfighting abilities.
Contradiction 5 – On the PPBE Timeline
- The inflexible PPBE timeline limits the ability of non-traditional companies to contribute their expertise and products to the acquisition process.
- The current system already facilitates the adoption of new technologies from these companies.
Contradiction 6 – On technology Innovation
- The DoD should incorporate more innovative technologies rather than focusing solely on hardware and large acquisition programs.
- The DoD has implemented many innovation funds in the past, but they often yield underwhelming results and are not fully utilized.
Due to the contradictory views on PPBE, the Commission received similarly disparate and wide-ranging opinions on how to improve it. The more conservative suggestions focused on particular reform issues:
- The Commission should resolve the "trust gap" between the DoD and Congress.
- Software requires strong emphasis during requirements generation to aid its development.
- There is a strong need for improving data relevancy and presentation.
- The DoD needs to integrate new technologies into the PPBE process faster to match commercial innovation.
- The DoD should adopt greater tolerance for innovation risk within the limits of Congressional oversight.
Other suggestions are more comprehensive and have more radical implications for PPBE reform, including:
- The Commission should revamp the entire defense resource allocation system, not just make small reforms.
- The resource allocation system should balance flexibility, transparency, and accountability.
- The DoD needs a budget process that is more flexible and responsive to operational needs.
- Developing strategy-driven budgets and capabilities is an urgent necessity, even if it requires significant modifications to the PPBE process.
Conclusion
Two camps have emerged among those who provided suggestions. The conservative proposals target separate procedural inefficiencies that need improvement. Though minor reforms are generally easier to implement, this approach to fixing PPBE may fail to consider deep-seated, interrelated dysfunctions that plague the core of the process itself. The more comprehensive recommendations seek to streamline decision-making and reduce bureaucratic obstacles for the entire process. However, a full PPBE overhaul bears a high risk of obstruction due to resource constraints, a lack of consensus among stakeholders, and political resistance within both the DoD and Congress.
Both approaches have their own strengths and weaknesses, and the PPBE Reform Commission should try to reconcile the recommendations. The Commission must consider the practical implications, such as the resources required, potential impact on organizations, and political feasibility, as well as identify which of the underlying principles and goals of the PPBE process are still relevant and which should be cut or reformed. This will show which ideas for reform would truly improve or disrupt defense resource allocation.
You can read the full Commission report here: https://ppbereform.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/PPBE-REFORM-COMMISSION-STATUS-UPDATE-MAR-2023-Public.pdf
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